[Guille]

As I didn't explain my argument in the previous post, I want to explain each point here, to clarify what I mean.

Originally Posted by <<>> 1. Assume the distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths is true.

What I mean here is that we must assume that there is really a difference between contingent and necessary truths such as it is true to state this.

Originally Posted by <<>> 2. If the distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths is true, then this truth is contingent.

I mist to put why here. Well, to make a distinction there must be two different positions in reality. And the position in which necessary truths are is different to that in which contingent truths are. The first is based in our concepts of the meaning of things, and the second resides in our percepts of the existence of things. Therefore, the distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths is determined by reality, and so it is a contingent truth.

Originally Posted by <<>> 3. If the truth is contingent, it is not implied by the meaning.

For what contingent truths mean is that it is implied by reality, not by meaning.

Originally Posted by <<>> 4. It is implied by the meaning (of necessary truths and contingent truths).

We know that the meaning of these two types of truths implies the distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, as there is a difference between them by what each differently means. This may seem contradictory to where I said it is contingent, but it’s not contradictory, it’s just that the distinction is both necessary and contingent.

Originally Posted by <<>> 7. If the truth is both contingent and necessary, it is not a truth.

This I must explain. A truth which is necessary as “all high buildings are high” is true because it is implied by itself, not because it is implied from reality (although of course, it is implied by reality that all the high buildings are high, but what really makes it a truth is that the high buildings must be high). Whiles a truth that is contingent as “the book is on the table” depend on reality and how things are: and yes, the book is on the table. But why is the book on the table? It is there because it is implied by itself, by the meaning of the book right now (which is to be on the table):



What I’ve proven here is that necessary truths are actually contingent truths and contingent truths are actually necessary. And as we’ve proven that the distinction between these truths is both contingent and necessary, we must now derive that: the distinction between the truths is a necessary truth because it is contingent and contingent because it is necessary. This is the classical argument: it’s a because it’s b and b because it’s a. And this argument is one applied and valuable for necessary truths, as necessary truths depend on the meaning and here the meaning of the thing implies that it is the other thing.



Therefore: not only the fact that necessary truths are necessarily contingent truths and that contingent truths are contingently necessary truths, but also that the distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths is a necessary truth and son necessarily a contingent truth and a contingent truth and so contingently a necessary truth, is all a necessary truth. But as being a necessary truth it is a contingent truth, and here we lead to the same infinite contradiction. Therefore, a truth cannot be contingent and necessary, but must be contingent because necessary and/or necessary because contingent.

Originally Posted by <<>> Therefore: The distinction between necessary truths (analytic) and contingent truths (synthetic) is false (i.e. wrong).

This is derived as the distinction is both contingent and necessary.