Knowledge as Computation in vivo: Semantics vs. Pragmatics as Truth vs. Meaning
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
Department of Computer Science and Electronics
Mälardalen University
Västerås, Sweden
+46 21 15 17 25
4400 words
Abstract.
Following the worldwide increase in communications through computer networking, not only economies, entertainment, and arts but also research and education are transforming into global systems. Attempts to automate knowledge discovery and enable the communication between computerized knowledge bases encounter the problem of the incompatibility of syntactically identical expressions of different semantic and pragmatic provenance. Coming from different universes, terms with the same spelling may have a continuum of meanings. The formalization problem is related to the characteristics of the natural language semantic continuum. The human brain has through its evolution developed the capability to communicate via natural languages. We need computers able to communicate in similar, more flexible ways, which calls for a new and broader understanding far beyond the limits of formal axiomatic reasoning that characterize the Turing machine paradigm. This paper arguments for the need of a new approach to the ideas of truth and meaning based on logical pluralism, as a consequence of the new interactive understanding of computing, that necessitates going far beyond Turing limit.
Background
Leibniz's dream of Mathesis Universalis, a universal science encompassing all existing knowledge, appears today to be a matter of the practical utilization of Informatics. The necessity of conceptualization of global informational space calls for an understanding across the borders of previously independent universes embedded in their local contexts. The construction of a universal knowledge system is clearly a considerably more complex task than was originally imagined and even the much more modest ambition of obtaining a smooth flow of knowledge between sub-fields of a multi-disciplinary area meets significant problems.
Post-modernists deny that we can justify knowledge by reference to either empirical facts (pragmatics) or logical truths (semantics), because of the constructed nature of knowledge, so they endorse an “anything goes” philosophy. However, even recognizing the fact that knowledge always is context-dependent, it is possible to establish epistemology upon a practice (pragmatics) as a criterion of meaningfulness instead of searching for absolute truths in semantics. Wittgenstein’s claim in Philosophical Investigations "Meaning just its use." presents possible grounds for a pragmatic approach to meaning that encompass language as both thought expression and speech act. It may also apply to information processing in physical systems such as living organisms. Acting in the physical world may be seen as a generalization of a language game in which linguistic symbols are replaced by physical objects such as e.g. molecules.
The problem of absolutes has become acute nowadays: no absolute time, space or vacuum, no preferred coordinate system; there is no longer firm ground for absolute truths. What remains however, is scientific truthlikenss - the best truth in given circumstances according to our best knowledge. There is an essential difference between truth and truthlikeness in that truth is absolute, objective and eternal, while truthlikeness is relative, constructed and evolving. The problem of linguistic holism may be resolved by replacing identity with similitude and veracity with verisimilitude. We can learn from biological systems which through evolution have developed semantic metabolism(Maturana, Varela) as a cognitive response to the problem of shifting contexts.
Popper was the first prominent realist philosopher and scientist to adopt a radical fallibilism about science, defending at the same time the epistemic superiority of scientific method. Popper was the first philosopher to abandon the idea that science concerns truth and to take the problem of truthlikeness seriously. In his early work, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper implied that the only kind of progress an inquiry can make consists in falsification of theories. (Popper, 1980) Now how can a succession of falsehoods constitute epistemic progress? Epistemic optimism means that if some false hypotheses are closer to the truth than others, if truthlikeness (verisimilitude) admits of degrees, then the history of inquiry may turn out to be one of steady progress towards the goal of truth.
“While truth is the aim of inquiry, some falsehoods seem to realize
this aim better than others. Some truths better realize the aim than
other truths. And perhaps even some falsehoods realize the aim better
than some truths do.”