
Originally Posted by
protheory
I see the definition of Russell's Paradox as "is the set of all sets a member of itself?"
I don't think this is quite right. If the set of all sets is a member of itself this is not necessarily a contradiction. Usually the starting point is the set of all sets that do not contain themselves. Call this W. Is W a member of itself? If it is, then it is not. If it is not then it is.
This kind of paradox shares its characteristics with other paradoxes too, such as "is the word word a word?" and "Is this a question?"
Again, I think this not quite right. Yes, the word 'word is a word. There is nothing paradoxical in this idea. 'Is this a question? is a bit trickier, but the answer seems to be a simple yes.
I also see "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" in the same way and I think that a common root runs within all paradoxes of this kind.
I agree. The common root, in my opinion, is epistemilogical/cosmological dualism. That is, the idea that meaningful statements must always be true or false.
If there is really a common form within all paradoxes, and therefore a universally applicable method for understanding them (a TOE) then it should follow that if we can understand and explain one paradox through Pro theory, we should be able to explain them all.
I agree again. In the same vein, Martin Heidegger argued that all metaphysical problems are the same problem and therefore have the same answer. This seems obvious to me but, needless to say, as yet not everyone agrees.
The paradox and the answer within all of these similar ideas is that we need to use three answers to account for the three possibilities, at least that's what I think about it.
I sort of agree. But your explanation of this idea suggest to me, pardon me for saying this, that you are trying to reinvent the wheel from scratch when it might be better to focus on a literature review.
You may like these extracts. They all concern what I've called 'epistemilogical dualism', and they suggest that the 'tertium non datur' rule of ordinary logic is the cause of metaphysical paradoxes. The first, for instance, suggests that the ancient One and Many paradox that baffled the early Greek philosophers (and most ever since) is a product of our assumption that in cosmology either monism or dualism must be true. Sorry about the change of font, can't put it right in quick reply mode.
"Reality is one. It must be single, because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity. To suppose the universe plural is therefore to contradict oneself and, after all, to supose that it is one. Add one world to another, and forthwith both worlds have become relative, each the finite appearance of a higher and single Reality. And plurality as appearances (we have seen) must fall within, must belong to, must qualify the unity.
We have an idea of this unity which, to some extent, is positive. It is true that how in detail the plurality comes together we do not know. And it is true again that unity, in its more proper sense, is known only as contra-distinguished from plurality. Unity therefore, as an aspect over against and defined by another aspect, is itself but appearance. And in this sense the Real, it is clear, cannot be properly called one. It is possible, however, to use unity with a different meaning."
Francis H. Bradley
Appearance and Reality (1893)
"Where knowledge is of a dual nature (as between subject and object) then the self hears, sees, smells, tastes and feels: it knows everything.[But] where knowledge is not of a dual nature, it transcends cause, effect and action [of any kind], [it is] beyond speech, nothing can be likened to it, one cannot tell of it."
Maitri Upanishad
V, 7
"The position is simply this. In ordinary algebra, complex values are accepted as a matter of course, and the more advanced techniques would be impossible without them. In Boolean algebra (and thus, for example, in all our reasoning processes) we disallow them. Whitehead and Russell introduced a special rule, which they called the Theory of Types, expressly to do so. Mistakenly, as it now turns out. So, in this field, the more advanced techniques, although not impossible, simply don’t yet exist. At the present moment we are constrained, in our reasoning processes, to do it the way it was done in Aristotle’s day."
G. Spencer Brown
Laws of Form (1969)
"What we do … is extend the concept to Boolean algebras, which means that a valid argument may contain not just three classes of statement, but four: true, false, meaningless and imaginary. The implications of this, in the fields of logic, philosophy, mathematics, and even physics, are profound."
G. Spencer Brown
Laws of Form
"A certain caliph, wanting to test an idea on an unsophisticated person, asked his guards to range into the desert and bring him a bedouin Arab. They surrounded the first one whom they met, who happened to be a Sufi. ‘The Commander of the Faithful requires your presence,’ said the captain of the guard. ‘Who are the faithful, and how do they come to have a Commander?’ he asked. The soldiers concluded that this was indeed an unsophisticated man, and they brought him before the Caliph.
‘I have been told,’ said the ruler, ‘that bedouins are so ignorant that they do not know the simplest things.’
‘Who has told you?’
‘It was during a discussion with my intellectual advisers’.
‘If it is intellect you want, the problem is easy enough. Ask me anything.’
The Caliph ordered a dish of porridge to be brought. The Arab sniffed it and began to eat. ‘What is that?’ asked the Caliph.
‘Something that can be safely eaten,’ said the bedouin.
‘Yes, but what is its name?’
‘Adopting the methods of formal logic, applied to the knowledge available to me, I say that this is pomegranates.’
There was a laugh from the assembled scholastics who had told the Caliph that the bedouins were fools.
‘And how, pray, do you come to that conclusion?’
‘By the same methods that your scholastics use. I have heard the phrase "Dates and pomegranates" used to describe tasty foods. Now I know what dates are, as I live on them. This is not dates. Therefore it must be pomegranates.’
From ‘Esoteric Research’ (Tahqiq-I-Batini).
Reputedly written by Sir-Dan (Knower of Secrets) Daud Waraqi.