AN EASY OUTLINE OF EVOLUTION, by Dennis Hird, M.A., copyright 1903MR. HERBERT SPENCER, in First Principles, p. 30, says: "Respecting the origin of the universe three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent; or that it is self-created; or that it is created by an external agency."
Chapter 10
THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD
By the aid of Dean Mansel, he proves that each of these suppositions is inconceivable.
The Very Reverend Dean says: "The conception of the Absolute and the Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradiction," among other reasons because we can do nothing "towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite."
Those who wish to see all this worked out with much subtlety must go to First Principles. We only refer to it here to show that none of the three suppositions named above stand in the way of scientific inquiry or help us in this inquiry. If they are all alike unthinkable, then they are of equal value or no value in helping us to a knowledge of causation.
For clearly science can only deal with what can be known.
To say "that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable" might be a fitting burial service for much metaphysical dust, and, in addition to this, it opens a free highway to the searcher after truth.
But we do not proceed far on this path of inquiry before we meet two monsters which, in more senses than one, have devoured the sons of men—I mean, Space and Time.
Mr. Spencer asks: "What are space and time? Two hypotheses are current respecting them: the one that they are objective, and the other that they are subjective—the one that they are external to, and independent of, ourselves; the other that they are internal and appertain to our own consciousness."
He examines the statement that space and time are entities, and the contention that they are forms of thought, and arrives at the conclusion "that space and time are wholly incomprehensible."
He next examines matter, and says: "In its ultimate nature it is as absolutely incomprehensible as space and time."
Motion and force he finds equally incomprehensible in their ultimate natures.
The position of the man of science is thus summed up:—
"Supposing him, in every case, able to resolve the appearances, properties, and movements of things into manifestations of force in space and time, he still finds that force, space, and time pass all understanding. Similarly, though the analysis of mental actions may finally bring him down to sensations, as the original materials out of which all thought is woven, yet he is little forwarder; for he can give no account either of sensations themselves or of that something which is conscious of sensations. Objective and subjective things he thus ascertains to be alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis. In all directions his investigations eventually bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma; he learns at once the greatness and the littleness of the human intellect; its power in dealing with all that comes within the range of experience; its impotence in dealing with all that transcends experience. He realises with a special vividness the utter incomprehensibleness of the simplest fact considered in itself. He, more than any other, truly knows that in its ultimate essence nothing can be known" (pp. 66 and 67).
Of course, some readers will note that this last sentence begs the whole question as to whether there is such a thing as ultimate essence or not, just as the former conclusion begged the question as to whether the universe manifests one Power which is inscrutable.
Mr. Spencer next deals with the relativity of all knowledge, and thinks he proves that the relative and the absolute stand or fall together. But many hold that in this he fails, for one may be real and the other may not.
Now, all notions which deal with suppositions outside human experience are properly called transcendental. The transcendental is of no value to science, for it does not admit of being known or verified.
Mr. Spencer points out that "relations are of two orders: relations of sequence and relations of co-existence, of which the one is original and the other derivative." "The abstract of all sequences is time; the abstract of all co-existences is space."
"Space and time, therefore, are relative realities."
"Our conception of matter, reduced to its simplest shape, is that of co-existent positions that offer resistance." "Hence the necessity we are under of representing to ourselves the ultimate elements of matter as being at once extended and resistant." Our experience of force is that out of which the idea of matter is built.
Matter is another relative reality.
"Our conception of motion as presented or represented in the developed consciousness involves the conceptions of space, of time, and of matter. A something that moves; a series of positions occupied in succession; and a group of co-existent positions united in thought with the successive ones—these are the constituents of the idea."
"Motion, as we know it, is thus traceable, in common with the other ultimate scientific ideas, to experiences of force."
"We come down, then, finally to force as the ultimate of ultimates." Space, time, matter, motion, as we know them, are all either built up of, or abstracted from, experiences of force.
These scrappy quotations from First Principles are not given as representing Mr. Spencer's argument, but merely to clear the way for our inquiry into the Evolution of the World.
Perhaps it would be of help to some readers to refer to Professor Karl Pearson's newer setting of this doctrine.
Many great minds have pondered over this question in different generations. Descartes said; "Give me extension and motion, and I will construct the world."
Mr. Pearson says; "'Give me motion and space capable of changing its shape, and I will explain the universe to you, is far more rational than Kant's 'Give me matter, and I will create the world,' for matter being granted not much universe is left to be explained."
Again; "Force is not, then, a real cause of change in motion. It is merely a description of change in motion. But force, being the how of a motion, may naturally suggest that matter is that which moves."
"The sensible existence of matter is entirely dependent on the existence of motion—that is, change of position and change of shape."
"If we bring any two bodies together, we notice that they change each other's motion. Everything in the universe is changing the motion of every other thing."
"Science has reduced the universe, not to those unintelligible concepts, matter and force, but to the very intelligible concept, MOTION. All that we know of mass is its measurement in motion" (lecture on "Matter and Soul," 1886).
Extension and motion may be the necessary properties of matter. At least, we know that where there is motion there is matter. And, whether we use the terms
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"Matter and Force" or "Matter and Motion," we recognise the accepted conclusions of science that both are indestructible. This greatest of discoveries teaches us that neither can be destroyed, so that it is almost certain as they can have no end that they had no beginning.
This is called the transformation and equivalence of forces. That is, just as the same particles of matter may at one time form parts of a rose and at another time parts of a mushroom, so the same force may at one time strike a church as lightning, and at another time may be the mother-love which rocks the cradle.
This will not be deemed fanciful by the reader who masters the following: "The transformations of electricity into other modes of force are still more clearly demonstrable. Produced by the motion of heterogeneous bodies in contact, electricity generates magnetism in a bar of soft iron; and now the rotation of a permanent magnet generates currents of electricity. Here we have a battery in which, from the play of chemical affinities, an electric current results; and there, in the adjacent cell, we have an electric current effecting chemical decomposition. In the conducting wire we witness the transformation of electricity into heat; while in electric sparks and in the voltaic arc we see light produced. Atomic arrangement, too, is changed by electricity: as instance the transfer of matter from pole to pole of a battery; the fractures caused by the disruptive discharge; the formation of crystals under the influence of electric currents. And whether, conversely, electricity be or be not directly generated by re-arrangement of the atoms of matter, it is at any rate indirectly so generated through the intermediation of magnetism.
(To be continued.)


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